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## DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

MFG. 11-70

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INFO OCT-01 (CCO-00, CIAE-00, ) W

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SECRET SECTION 1 OF 3 CAIRO 511

EXDIS

SUBJECT: WILEY VISIT TO ISRAEL, MARCH 1-5, 1971

1. AT SUGGESTION OF DCM, EMBASSY TEL AVIV, [REDACTED] IS SUBMITTING FOLLOWING REPORT COVERING DISCUSSIONS [REDACTED] HELD WITH UPPER AND MIDDLE LEVEL OFFICIALS IN ISRAELI MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, IDF INTELLIGENCE, AND OTHER INFLUENTIAL ISRAELI CITIZENS DURING HIS VISIT TO ISRAEL MARCH 1-5. FONOFF OFFICIALS VISITED INCLUDED MORDECHAI GAZIT, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR GENERAL IN CHARGE OF NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS AND JARRING MISSION; MOSHE SASSON, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS; JOSEPH HADDAS, DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH; MRS. Yael VERED, DIRECTOR OF DEPARTMENT OF MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS; AND MICHAEL ELIZUR, OFFICE OF NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS. [REDACTED] ALSO HAD LONG DISCUSSIONS WITH COL. SHALEV, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF IDF INTELLIGENCE; SHMUEL SEGEV, ARAB AFFAIRS CORRESPONDENT FOR MAARIV; AMNON RUBENSTEIN, DEAN OF TEL AVIV LAW SCHOOL WHO IS ALSO WELL-KNOWN WRITER AND TV PERSONALITY ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS; MAYOR KOLLECK OF JERUSALEM WHOM WILEY HAD KNOWN PREVIOUSLY; AND KOLLECK'S DEPUTY BENVENISTI.

2. ALL THESE CONVERSATIONS COVERED SIMILAR GROUND. MOST IMPORTANT FEATURE WAS APPARENT ISRAELI OPENNESS TO NEW THINKING OF ARAB-ISRAELI RELATIONS. [REDACTED] HAD LAST VISITED ISRAEL IN NOVEMBER 1969 JUST BEFORE ISRAELI AIR FORCE BEGAN DEEP PENETRATION BOMBINGS OF UAR. AT THAT TIME [REDACTED] HAD GAINED IMPRESSION THAT ISRAELI MINDS WERE CLOSED AND THAT ISRAEL'S POLICY WAS BASED ON HIGH DEGREE OF

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UNANIMITY AT ALL LEVELS. ON THIS VISIT, BY CONTRAST, [REDACTED] GAINED 25X1A IMPRESSION THAT RECENT EVENTS HAVE INITIATED PROCESS OF RE-EVALUATION AND RE-THINKING OF MANY OF ISRAEL'S BASIC POLICY POSITIONS. [REDACTED] RECEIVED NO INDICATION, HOWEVER, THAT THIS PROCESS HAS AS YET PENETRATED TO HIGHEST LEVELS GOI.

3. TWO MAJOR EVENTS WHICH APPARENTLY INITIATED PROCESS OF RE-EXAMINATION IN ISRAEL WERE: 1) SHOCK EXPERIENCED IN SPRING OF 1970 WHEN IDF SUDDENLY FOUND ITSELF FACE TO FACE WITH RUSSIAN FORCES IN UAR, AND 2) UNEXPECTEDLY FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE BY EGYPTIANS IN JARRING TALKS WHICH DID NOT FIT ISRAELI PRECONCEPTIONS OF ARAB MIND AND ARAB TACTICS.

4. MAJOR BARRIER TO ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN ISRAELI POLICY IS CONTINUING NAGGING QUESTION OF WHETHER UAR PEACE INITIATIVE CAN BE ACCEPTED AT FACE VALUE OR WHETHER IT IS ONLY A TACTIC DESIGNED TO PROVIDE ARABS WITH A BETTER OFFENSIVE POSITION FROM WHICH TO LAUNCH NEXT AND FINAL ROUND AGAINST ISRAEL. IN REPLY TO THIS RECURRING QUESTION, [REDACTED] POINTED OUT THAT EGYPTIANS HAVE APPARENTLY TAKEN HARD DECISION TO MAKE POLITICAL CONCLUSIONS THAT COULD HAVE TREMENDOUS PSYCHOLOGICAL AND EMOTIONAL IMPACT ON ARAB WORLD. IF RECOGNIZED ARAB LEADERSHIP, PARTICULARLY UAR LEADERSHIP, ENGAGED IN RITUAL ACT OF SIGNING PEACE AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL AND SOLEMNLY PRONOUNCED ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST, A NEW TREND OF THOUGHT WOULD AT LONG LAST DEVELOP IN THE ARAB WORLD WHICH MIGHT BREAK THE OLD PATTERNS OF BITTERNESS AND GRADUALLY LEAD TO ULTIMATE ISRAELI GOAL OF RECOGNITION BY ITS NEIGHBORS AS A LEGITIMATE MEMBER OF MIDDLE EAST FAMILY OF NATIONS. WILEY ALSO SAID THAT IT WAS IRRATIONAL TO COMPLETELY DISCOUNT THE SECURITY BENEFITS OF INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES AND PEACE-KEEPING FORCES BECAUSE ONE PARTICULAR FORM OF PEACE-KEEPING ARRANGEMENT HAD BROKEN DOWN IN 1967.

5. [REDACTED] SUGGESTED THAT ISRAEL HAD PLACED TOO MUCH EMPHASIS ON TERRITORIAL ASPECTS WHEN CONSIDERING FUTURE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. 1967 WAR HAD BEEN WON IN THE AIR IN FIRST FEW HOURS DESPITE SO-CALLED "INDEFENSIBLE BORDERS" THAT EXISTED AT THAT TIME. RECENT ARMS ACQUISITION PROGRAMS ON BOTH SIDES HAD FURTHER EMPHASIZED THESE TRENDS AND IN ANY FUTURE WAR ISSUE WOULD BE QUICKLY DECIDED BY HEAT SEEKING MISSILES, SUPERSONIC AIRCRAFT AND SOPHISTICATED ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT. ALTHOUGH PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECT OF BORDERS UNDERSTANDABLY PROMINENT

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IN ISRAELI THINKING, IT WOULD BE TRAGIC IF ISRAELIS WERE  
TO PASS UP REAL POLITICAL ADVANTAGES NOW OFFERED BY ARABS BECAUSE OF  
OUT-MODED CONSIDERATIONS OF TERRITORIAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.

25X1A 6. [REDACTED] ALSO SUGGESTED THAT RETENTION OF SHARM EL SHEIKH AND  
NARROW STRIP OF EASTERN SIDE OF SINAI PENINSULA COULD CREATE  
DIFFICULT DEFENSIVE SITUATION FOR ISRAEL. IF ISRAEL REMAINED  
STRONG ENOUGH TO PROTECT TROOPS STATIONED AT THE END OF NARROW  
STRIP OF LAND ON EAST COAST OF SINAI, ISRAEL WOULD THEN BE  
STRONG ENOUGH TO ASSURE FREE SHIPPING FOR ISRAEL VESSELS THROUGH  
SHARM EL SHEIKH WHETHER OR NOT ISRAELI TROOPS WERE STATIONED NEXT  
TO STRAITS. IF ISRAEL BECAME UNABLE DEFEND CONTINGENTS STATIONED  
THERE, TROOPS COULD EASILY BE CUT OFF AND WOULD BECOME USHOSTAGE.  
ISRAELI INTERLOCATORS GENERALLY CONCEDED VALIDITY THIS POINT  
BUT CLAIMED PRESENCE OF TROOPS AT SHARM EL SHEIKH WOULD GIVE  
POLITICAL ADVANTAGE TO ISRAEL BY MAKING IT CLEAR IN CASE OF  
FUTURE WAR THAT EGYPTIANS HAD ATTACKED FIRST. [REDACTED] REPLIED  
THAT ISRAEL MIGHT CONSIDER OTHER ARRANGEMENTS SUCH AS PEACE-  
KEEPING FORCES THAT COULD PROVIDE SAME ADVANTAGE WITHOUT RUNNING  
RISK OF JEOPARDIZING POLITICAL GAINS WHICH ARABS NOW OFFERING  
ISRAELIS IN RETURN FOR COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI.

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*He wants entire  
narrow strip  
strip are still there  
which will permit  
Israeli response*

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EXDIS

7. ISRAELIS ALSO MADE MAJOR POINT OF ARAB REFUSAL ENTER DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS AND ASKED HOW ISRAEL COULD ACCEPT ARAB PROFESSIONS OF PEACEFUL INTENTIONS WHILE AT SAME TIME ARABS REFUSE TO TALKS TO ISRAELIS FACE TO FACE. [REDACTED] REPLIED THAT ISRAEL HAD DESCRIBED NEGOTIATION PROCESS AS "NEGOTIATIONS ON BOUNDARIES". THIS HAD LEAD ARABS TO BELIEVE THAT NEGOTIATIONS OFFERED BY ISRAELIS WERE NOT REALLY NEGOTIATIONS AT ALL BUT ONLY DEMAND FOR ARABS TO SIT AROUND TABLE WHILE ISRAELIS TOLD THEM HOW MUCH OF THEIR LAND THEY WOULD GET BACK AND HOW MUCH WOULD BE KEPT BY ISRAELIS. SINCE ISRAEL NOW OCCUPIED THE LAND AND HAD MILITARY SUPERIORITY ON THE GROUND, ARABS BELIEVED THEY HAD NO CARDS TO PLAY IN THIS TYPE OF GAME AND THEREFORE REFUSED TO SIT DOWN AT THE TABLE. [REDACTED] SAID THAT IT WAS HIS VIEW THAT ARABS WOULD CONTINUE TO REFUSE TO CEDE LAND UNDER DURESS. ON OTHER HAND, IF EGYPTIANS WERE REASONABLY CONFIDENT THAT NEGOTIATIONS WOULD TAKE FORM OF POLITICAL CONCESSIONS FROM EGYPT IN RETURN FOR ALL OF EGYPTIAN TERRITORY NOW OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL, IT IS PROBABLE EGYPTIANS WOULD BE READY NEGOTIATE THROUGH JARRING OR EVEN THROUGH DIRECT SECRET CONTACTS. UNFORTUNATELY, ISRAELI REPLY TO JARRING MEMO WOULD PROBABLY CONFIRM ARAB SUSPICIONS ON ISRAELI NEGOTIATING INTENTIONS AND MAKE IT LESS LIKELY THAT EGYPTIANS WOULD ENTER INTO MORE RESPONSIVE NEGOTIATION POSTURE.

8. [REDACTED] CONVERSATION WITH MORDECHAI GAZIT WAS HIGH POINT OF VISIT. GAZIT APPEARED TO BE TIRED AND UNDER CONSIDERABLE STRAIN. WILEY HAD KNOWN GAZIT PREVIOUSLY AND DISCUSSION WAS FREE WHEELING AND AT TIMES

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HEATED. GAZIT BEGAN BY GIVING OFFICIAL ISRAELI LINE AND JUSTIFICATION THEREFOR. HE ALSO SHOWED CONSIDERABLE ANGER TOWARDS JARRING AND SAID JARRING WAS "VERY STUPID" IN HIS HANDLING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. MAIN THRUST OF HIS CRITICISM WAS THAT JARRING WAS USING TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT APPROACH

AARERNA DOCUMENTS THAT OVERSIMPLIFIED COMPLEX MATTERS. GAZIT IMPLIED THAT JARRING'S PROPER ROLE WAS TO PROVIDE MORE EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATIONS CHANNEL THROUGH WHICH BOTH SIDES COULD QUIETLY EXPRESS THEIR ANXIETIES AND CONCERNS AND WORK TOWARD MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY POSITION BY SLOWLY BUILDING UP AREAS OF UNDERSTANDING ON THE COMPLEX ISSUES INVOLVED. GAZIT THEN MADE FLAT STATEMENT THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT RETURN TO THE '67 BORDERS WITH EGYPT SINCE EGYPT HAD LOST THE WAR AND MUST PAY THE PRICE. COMMENT: LATER IN CONVERSATION, GAZIT ATTEMPTED TO SOFTEN THIS POSITION BY POINTING OUT THAT PRIME MINISTER HAD TOLD ZURHELLEN THAT NON-RETURN TO '67 LINES WAS AN ISRAELI POSITION BUT NOT A CONDITION

FOR NEGOTIATIONS. HE SAID ISRAEL WAS WILLING TO NEGOTIATE WITHOUT PRIOR CONDITIONS BUT, HE ADDED, THE POSITION OF NON-WITHDRAWAL WAS ONE THAT WAS "UNLIKELY" TO CHANGE. END COMMENT. GAZIT THEN CONTINUED WITH OFFICIAL LINE THAT TERRITORIAL CHANGES IN SINAI WERE NECESSARY BECAUSE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN EGYPT HAD CREATED NECESSITY FOR BETTER PROTECTION OF ISRAELI HOMELAND FROM SOVIET AGGRESSION. WILEY POINTED OUT THAT EGYPTIANS WERE NO MORE ANXIOUS THAN ANY OTHER COUNTRY TO BE OCCUPIED BY FOREIGN TROOPS AND AFTER A SETTLEMENT WAS ACHIEVED WITH ISRAEL, THERE WOULD BE NO REASON AT ALL FOR EGYPTIANS TO INVITE SOVIET INFANTRY OR ARMORED UNITS INTO EGYPT WHICH MIGHT BECOME A REAL THREAT TO EGYPTIAN INDEPENDENCE. GAZIT ASKED "HOW DO WE KNOW WHAT THE EGYPTIANS WILL DO? WE MUST PREPARE FOR ALL CONTINGENCIES". [REDACTED] REPLIED THAT IF GOI SERIOUSLY BELIEVED THAT EGYPT WOULD TURN ITSELF OVER TO RUSSIAN MILITARY OCCUPATION AFTER THE MILITARY THREAT FROM ISRAEL HAD BEEN REMOVED, THERE WAS INDEED NO HOPE FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE VOICES OF REASON WERE OBVIOUSLY BEING STILLED AND THE ONLY POSSIBLE OUTCOME WOULD BE A CONTINUING WAR OF ATTRITION IN WHICH EGYPT WOULD NOT BE WITHOUT LONG RUN ADVANTAGES DUE TO HER VAST MANPOWER RESOURCES AND HER RELATIVE INVULNERABILITY TO DESTRUCTION AS A NATIONAL ENTITY.

9. AT THIS POINT, GAZIT BECAME RATHER AGITATED AND BEGAN PACING AROUND THE ROOM. HE SAID HE HAD GIVEN THE OFFICIAL ISRAELI POSITION AND AS FAR AS HE COULD SEE, IT WAS UNLIKELY TO CHANGE. HE THEN RATHER SURPRISINGLY SAID THAT HE WOULD NOW PRESENT HIS PERSONAL OPINION

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WHICH HE HASTENED TO ADD HAD NO OFFICIAL STANDING WITH THE GOI. HE SAID HE WOULD MAKE PEACE WITH EGYPT IF THREE BASIC CONDITIONS WERE MET. HE DESCRIBED THESE AS:

A. IRON-CLAD GUARANTEES FOR THE STRAITS OF TIRAN PERHAPS IN FORM OF A CONVENTION SIGNED BY ALL RIPARIAN STATES IN THE GULF OF AQABA ON THE MODEL OF THE MONTREUX CONVENTION WHICH HAD PROVED TO BE A DURABLE DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF SHIPPING THE BOSPHOROUS.

B. DEMILITARIZATION IN DEPTH IN THE SINAI PENINSULA WITH ADEQUATE INSPECTION ARRANGMENTS.

C. A SECURITY TREATY BETWEEN THE US AND ISRAEL THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY COVER ALL IMPORTANT ISRAELI SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. ON THE BASIS OF THESE THREE ARRANGEMENTS, GAZIT SAID HE WOULD BE WILLING TO WITHDRAW ALL ISRAELI FORCES TO THE JUNE 1957 ISRAEL-UAR BORDER. TOWARD THE END OF THE CONVERSATION, GAZIT ASKED WILEY TO TELL THE EGYPTIANS THAT ISRAEL IS SINCERE IN ASKING FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT PRIOR CONDITIONS. AS MENTIONED ABOVE, HE POINTED OUT THAT THE ISRAELI STAND ON NON-RETURN TO 1957 BORDERS IS A POSITION AND NOT A CONDITION. HE ALSO ASKED [REDACTED] TO CONVEY TO EGYPTIANS THE MESSAGE THAT THE ARAB REFUSAL OF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS HAD CREATED AN UNFORTUNATE EMOTIONAL REACTION AT HIGH LEVELS OF THE GOI. LONG HISTORY OF JEWS CONFINED IN GHETTOS HAD MADE THE ISRAELI LEADERSHIP PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE TO BEING TREATED AS PARIAHS WHO MUST BE ISOLATED FROM NORMAL INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMATIC INTERCOURSE.

NOTE BY OC/T: CAIRO 511. PARA. 8 LINE 9 ( ) AS RECEIVED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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EXDIS

10. IN DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHER POLITICALLY KNOWLEDGEABLE ISRAELIS, [REDACTED] WAS TOLD THAT WITHDRAWAL TO 1967 LINES WITH EGYPT WOULD NOT CREATE POLITICAL PROBLEM WITH ISRAELI PUBLIC. MAN ON STREET TRUSTED GOI LEADERS AND WOULD ACCEPT WHATEVER DECISION THEY MADE ON THIS ISSUE. ISRAELIS HAD NO PARTICULAR EMOTIONAL TIES WITH SINAI PENINSULA.

11. COMMENT: THROUGHOUT THESE CONVERSATIONS, [REDACTED] HAD IMPRESSION THAT OFFICIAL GOI POSITIONS NOW BEING WIDELY QUESTIONED WITHIN ISRAELI

POLITICAL UPPER CRUST. ALL OF THESE ISRAELIS WERE EAGER TO HEAR WILEY'S VIEWS ON EGYPT AND WERE INTERESTED IN DISCUSSING VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES FOR A SETTLEMENT WITH THE UAR. IN VIEW OF GAZIT'S CLOSE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP TO PRIME MINISTER AND HIS KEY POSITION AS COORDINATOR OF ISRAELI POSITION ON NEGOTIATIONS, IT IS SOMEWHAT SURPRISING HE WAS WILLING EXPRESS A PERSONAL VIEW CONSIDERABLY AT VARIANCE WITH OFFICIAL GOI POSITIONS. ALTHOUGH ISRAELI POLITICAL SYSTEM PLACES REAL EMPHASIS ON SENIORITY, IT SEEMS INEVITABLE THAT THESE STIRRINGS WILL EVENTUALLY HAVE SOME IMPACT ON OFFICIAL GOI POLICY. UNFORTUNATELY, THERE IS ALSO REAL DANGER THAT EGYPTIANS WILL GROW IMPATIENT AND TAKE STEPS THAT WOULD TEND TO SMOTHER ISRAELI PROCESS OF RE-THINKING BEFORE IT HAS HAD TIME TO YIELD RESULTS.

BERGUS

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